















The story goes something like this. Three brothers - identical triplets - are horribly injured in an automobile accident. Berford and Clyde suffer massive damage to their cerebral hemispheres; but their bodies and brain-stems are in fairly good shape. Albert's body is a hopeless mess; but his cerebral hemispheres are still working properly. The doctors decide to separate his hemispheres. One will be implanted in what used to be Berford's head and the other in Clyde's. The result of this remarkable surgery will be two patients, one in room B and the other in room C, each of whom is absolutely persuaded that he, and not the other, is Albert. In order to minimize confusion, the patient who will be in room B is 'Brodrick', and the one in C is 'Chester'.​[1]​
Analysis of this story plays a crucial part in Parfit's argument for the conclusion that 'what matters' in regard to 'survival' is not personal identity, but 'relation R'. And this conclusion, in turn, plays an important role in one of Parfit's principal objections to the 'Self-Interest Theory'. 
I divide Parfit's procedure into three phases. In phase one he argues for a 'Reductionist' approach to the problem about Albert, and, given this approach, for the view that Albert will not be Brodrick and will not be Chester (i.e. will not exist - will 'die'). In phase two he gives two or three arguments for the conclusion that 'what matters' is 'Relation R'. And finally, in phase three, he argues that adherence to the 'Self-Interest Theory' is irrational. 

Phase One (Section 89)

As I understand it, this phase begins with at least three important assumptions. First, we are assuming that personal identity is 'what matters'. Second, we are assuming a Non-Reductionist view of personal identity. And third, we are assuming that the successful transplantation of either hemisphere by itself, would save Albert's life.​[2]​  The first two assumptions are, presumably, to be refuted by subsequent argumentation. 
What does the first assumption mean? This is not entirely clear; but here is a start. Suppose that someone, say Randolf, is going to meet Algernon in a duel tomorrow at dawn. Naturally enough, he (Randolf) is concerned about whether or not he will be killed. He would like to live a long and happy life. Furthermore, Felicia (his sweetheart) is concerned about the outcome. According to one view, 'what matters' to Randolf and Felicia is whether or not there will be someone living, say twenty years from now, who will be Randolf. Perhaps this is 'what matters' to Algernon too - he has a violent hope that there will be no such person.

This is a question about personal identity. On one view, this is always what is important. I call this the view that personal identity is what matters. This is the natural view. The rival view is that personal identity is not what matters. I claim (that) what matters is Relation R: psychological connectedness and/or continuity with the right kind of cause. (p. 215)

We ought to be on guard against a potentially confusing ambiguity in regard to 'what matters'. It may brake up into [at least] three distinct topics for investigation. One task is to discover what it is that determines the proper extension of egoistic concern about the future. More generally, we want to see what constraints govern the temporal limits proper to love, and hatred, for particular people.​[3]​  Let me add that in this context 'proper' does not mean morally, or socially, acceptable, but rationally legitimate, not open to philosophical objections. For the most part, in what follows, I worry about this project, and, occasionally, its more general aspect. The second task is to discover what it is that governs the extension of legitimate self-identification. Under what conditions can one properly anticipate future pleasures and pains? The third project is an attempt to discover what is important and valuable, rather than trivial, or arbitrary, in regard to personal continuity. This last investigation might result in a defensible ranking of at least three or four of the principal features mentioned in plausible criteria of personal identity. 
Back to the tragic accident. There are, allegedly, just four 'possibilities' in regard to what will happen to Albert, or, at least, these are the only 'possibilities' under our present assumptions.​[4]​

(1) He will no longer exist 
(2) He will be in room B, and not in room C (Albert = Brodrick, and Albert ≠ Chester).
(3) He is will be in room C, and not in room A (Albert = Chester, and Albert ≠ Brodrick).
(4) He will be in room B and in room C (Albert = Brodrick, and Albert = Chester).

Although Parfit does not say so, Reductionists might well insist that there are other options.​[5]​ Here are four:

(5) It is indeterminate whether Albert will be Brodrick (but not Chester) or Chester (but not Brodrick). 
(6) It is indeterminate whether Albert will be Brodrick, or Chester, or both. 
(7) It is indeterminate whether Albert will be Brodrick, or Chester, or neither (i.e. will cease to exists).
(8) It is indeterminate whether Albert will cease to exist, or will be Brodrick, or Chester, or both  [Let's call this 'Full Indeterminacy' in regard to Albert's fate.]

Parfit attacks (1) - (4) (read as the alternative 'possibilities' on the non-reductionist view). There are two alleged objections to (1). First, "How could a double success be a failure?" (p. 256) And second, given that identity is what matters, (1) is 'implausible' - splitting is not as bad as death. (Ibid.) (2) and (3) are patently arbitrary. By hypothesis, Brodrick and Chester are equally good candidates for the privilege of having been Albert. (4) seems to give Parfit the most trouble. Why can't we hold that Brodrick and Chester were one and the same person (namely Albert) before the tragic accident, even though they are now different people? Parfit's discussion of this option ends with with a reference to his belief that some unnamed people have shown that 'tensed identity' won't solve the problem (pp. 257-258).​[6]​ In the aftermath of these attacks, Parfit recommends the Reductionist View. Reductionists accept the following three claims:

(1) The fact of a person's identity over time just consists in the holding of certain more particular facts. (p. 210)
(2) These facts can be described without either presupposing the identity of this person, or explicitly claiming that the experiences in this person's life are had by this person, or even explicitly claiming that this person exists. These facts can be described in an impersonal way. (Ibid.)
(3) A person's existence just consists in the existence of a brain and body, and the occurrence of a series of interrelated physical and mental events. (p. 211)​[7]​

'Non-Reductionists', we are told (third printing, p. 210), are those who reject (1) and (2). Parfit adds that all non-reductionists deny the possibility of indeterminate personal identity. [I don't see why they must do this.] Reductionists, on the other hand, are permitted to hold that personal identity can be indeterminate. (See p. 213)
Consider, for example, a 'Cartesian' theory of personal identity. On this view, a certain temporal segment, X, of a person, and another temporal segment, Y, of a person, are temporal segments of one and the same person if, and only if, X and Y have one and the same 'Cartesian ego'. Presumably, on this theory, no borderline cases are possible. [The Cartesian ego that was in Albert might migrate to Chester, or to Brodrick, or might 'depart'; but it either definitely exists, or definitely doesn't, and it either definitely is, or isn't, at work 'in' a given body.] One of Parfit's principal objectives is to free us from this sort of picture. (See Section 86.)
So far, the argument has been (a) that Non-Reductionism together with the theory that personal identity is 'what matters' compel us to accept (1), (2), (3), or (4); but (b), under these assumptions, all four 'possibilities' generate absurdities. Hence, we should either accept Reductionism or abandon the theory that personal identity is 'what matters'. Parfit thinks we should do both.
On the Reductionist view, there is nothing crucial that remains to be discovered about what will happen to Albert. We already know everything relevant to the case. The different 'possibilities' are just different ways of describing the obvious facts. (p. 258)
Nevertheless, Parfit does not leave it at this. We still want to know how to think about the case. Should we say that Albert will survive? Will he go on living or not? Parfit recommends answer (1). 

...if we do decide to give an answer to this empty question, one of these descriptions is better than the others. Since this is so, we can claim that this description is the answer to this question. And I claim that there is a best description of the case where (Albert) divides. The best description is that neither of the resulting people will be (Albert). (p. 260)

The idea is that we should abandon once and for all the non-reductionist view of personal identity. It seems to me that Parfit is basically right about this. Personal identity is determined by ordinary, everyday, facts. Unfortunately, these facts (or, more exactly, these facts plus the present conventions governing personal identity) leave Albert's fate indeterminate. Must we tolerate this? Of course not. If we want to, we can decide to say something definite about the outcome (i.e. tighten up the 'rules'). Parfit (in effect) suggests we should say that neither Chester nor Brodrick is Albert.
This recommendation is linked to a problem mentioned, but postponed, on page 207. The problem concerns a possible constraint governing personal identity across time - a 'Uniqueness' constraint. Let's take a look at this matter. It will be helpful to have in hand two or three rough sketches of possible criteria of personal identity.
Here is one:

Let X, Y, .... etc. be people.
The Plain Brain Criterion: X and Y are one and the same person if, and only if, X's brain is one and the same as Y's brain.​[8]​

What would this criterion have us say about Albert and Brodrick? Can a brain survive the amputation of all but one cerebral hemisphere? [A person (and a brain) can survive the loss of one hemisphere. But it does not follow that a person (or a brain) lives on so long as at least one hemisphere is operative.] Perhaps the answer is indeterminate. But then, according to this criterion, if one transplantation had succeeded while the other failed, it would have been indeterminate whether Albert had survived. The situation is even more confusing when both transplantations are successful. The Plain Brain Criterion may yield 'full indeterminacy' in regard to Albert's fate.​[9]​
Here is a more complex criterion. First we define a relation:

X at time t and Y at time t* are 'Brain Sharers' if and only if, X at t has enough of the brain Y had at t* to be the brain of a living person. (See p. 204)

Now we have: 
The Fancy Brain Criterion: X at t is one and the same person as Y at t*  if and only if, X at t is linked to Y at t* by a chain of overlapping Brain-Sharers.​[10]​

This criterion yields the conclusion that both Brodrick and Chester are Albert - they each presumably have enough of that original brain to do the job. Does it also follow that Brodrick and Chester are one and the same? I don't know. It all depends upon whether or not a single 'chain' of Brain-sharers can go both backwards and forwards in time (e.g. can go back down one branch of the Y from Brodrick into what is clearly part of Albert's life, and then forward again up the other branch of the Y into Chester's realm).
What we are doing? Are we looking for a criterion that nicely mirrors our present rules, practices, conventions, or whatever, for determining whether or not proposed time-crossing personal identity claims are true or false? This would be a descriptive task. Or, on the other hand, are we trying to work out what the criterion should be? This would be prescriptive. As I see it, the descriptive project takes precedence over the prescriptive one. We need a fairly good grip on our present rules, or whatever, before we can give serious consideration to their improvement. 
I think our intuition is that Brodrick and Chester are not the same person. Perhaps they used to be one person - namely Albert; but they are now two different people. Hence, I suggest, the Fancy Brain Criterion won't quite do.
Perhaps what is needed is some sort of 'Uniqueness' clause. Here is one possibility:

The One-Track Brain Criterion:  X at t is one and the same person as Y at t*  if and only if (1) X at t is linked to Y at t* by a chain of overlapping Brain-sharers, and (2) the trail of overlapping Brain-sharers has not taken a 'branching' form.​[11]​

Like the Fancy Brain Criterion, the One-Track Brain Criterion imperfectly reflects our present 'rules' (or whatever). According to this criterion, Brodrick is not Albert. The trail has a 'branching' form. Hence, Albert and Brodrick are different people. Ditto for Chester. So neither one is Albert. [To put it crudely, the criterion tells us that personal identity is just a matter of 'brain-linkage' plus the absence of any other strong competitor.] Clause (2) of the One-Track Brain Criterion is a 'killer clause'. But our present 'rules' (or whatever) leave this matter indeterminate.
Would Parfit deny that our present 'rules' leave us in the lurch in regard to whether Albert is Brodrick or Chester? I don't know. This much is clear: he holds that our criterion should include a uniqueness clause.​[12]​ And, in fact, he wants it to be a killer.
Where does he tell us why he wants such a powerful clause? I guess this is a part of what is supposed to be going on in his discussion of the case now before us. He is picking up the thread dropped on p. 260. The idea is that the 'best description' of the situation is (in effect) to say that Albert no longer exists. 
There are various options in regard to the dividing man. We can:

(a) Take the matter to be fully indeterminate, and leave it at that.
(b) Leave it indeterminate whether Albert is Brodrick (and not Chester) or Chester (and not Brodrick).
(c) Decide that Albert is fated to become both Brodrick and Chester (the 'tensed identity' approach).
(d) Decide that Albert is fated to be neither Brodrick nor Chester.





In order to follow the further ramifications of Parfit's discussion of division, we need to get at least a rough idea of criteria that are wholly or partially psychological. 
First two definitions:

X at t and Y at t* are 'Strongly Connected' if, and only if, there are enough direct psychological connections between them. (See p. 206)

This important stipulation can be clarified a bit. Parfit is thinking of such 'direct connections' as quasi-remembering, quasi-intending (See pp. 260-261), shared beliefs, dispositions, projects, and so on.​[13]​  'Direct connections' are direct causal connections. Thus, for example, if X at t believes that P, and this is explained, at least in part, by the fact that Y at t* believed that P, then this constitutes a 'direct connection' between X and Y. 
If the number of direct psychological connections between X at noon today and Y at noon yesterday is at least one half the average number that hold over twenty-four hour stretches in the lives of normal human adults, then it is determinate that X at noon today and Y at noon yesterday are 'strongly connected'.​[14]​ Somewhere below this number things get indefinite. But if there is only one  such connection across this stretch of time, the people thus related are definitely not 'strongly connected'.

X at t and Y at t* are 'Psychologically Continuous' if, and only if, X at t is linked to Y at t* by a sequence of people at times such that each person at a time in the sequence is strongly connected with the previous person at a time. (See p. 206)

Now the criterion itself:

The Psychological Criterion:  X at t and Y at t* are one and the same person if and only if (1) X at t is psychologically continuous with Y at t* and (2) the continuity trail has not taken a 'branching' form. (See the third printing version of p. 207)

Brodrick (X) is psychologically continuous with Albert (Y). But the trail 'branches'. Hence, according to this criterion, neither Brodrick nor Chester is Albert. (2) is a psychological killer clause.
Here is yet another candidate:

The Psycho-Physical Criterion:  X at t and Y at t* are one and the same person if, and only if, (1) X at t is psychologically continuous with Y at t* and (2) X at t is brain linked with Y at t* and (3) the continuity trail has not taken a 'branching' form.​[15]​

In the first printing of Reasons and Persons, Parfit advocated something more or less like the Psychological Criterion. He now urges us not to pick and choose among the various criteria (see third printing p. x). Why did Parfit originally prefer a psychological criterion to a physical one (e.g. the Plain Brain Criterion) or to a 'mixed' one (e.g. the Psycho-Physical Criterion)? The clearest answer comes in Appendix D ('Nagel's Brain').
Suppose Thelma has a brain disease. Luckily it can be cured. The doctors only need to replace all the cells in her brain with healthy duplicates. They have already prepared the necessary cells. Now the procedure can be gone through in two quite different ways. First, her sick brain could be removed as a unit and replaced in one fell swoop. Or, alternatively, chunks of the old brain could be replaced one by one, in a long series of operations. The first method gives 'Thelma' a new, and different (though psychologically indistinguishable), brain. Hence, according to criteria that make preservation of the brain, or some substantial portion of it, crucially important, Thelma won't survive this procedure. The second treatment modifies her poor old brain at a sufficiently leisurely pace for it to endure. Hence, those criteria say, under this treatment Thelma will live. Parfit, at least at one time, found these consequences utterly unbelievable.

In both of my cases, there will later be a person whose brain will be exactly like (Thelma's) present brain, except for the defects. As a result, this person will be fully psychologically continuous with (Thelma). And, in both cases, this person's brain will be composed of the very same new components, each of which is a replica of some part of (Thelma's) brain. The difference between the cases is merely the way in which these new parts are inserted. It is a difference in the ordering of removals and insertions.... Can this be the difference between life and death? (p. 475)

The argument is that Thelma will continue to exist in either case, even though in one case she winds up with a new (numerically distinct) brain. Hence, Parfit may have thought, our criterion of personal identity does not (or at least should not) require brain-linkage. 
It must be admitted that the story is somewhat embarrassing for those of us who think brains, and perhaps even bodies, play some important role in our present 'rules'. Apparently we are compelled to say the 'one fell swoop' procedure destroys Thelma. [This will not bother Parfit much. On his view, neither procedure endangers 'what matters'.]
Thelma's situation opens up the possibility of a Delian Woman. Suppose the disease spreads throughout her body, and thus the whole thing has to be replaced part by part until she is totally renewed. Meanwhile, the old parts will be saved and stored in a freezer (where, over time, the disease disappears). The happy ending is obvious. All those old parts - including the parts of her brain - will be reassembled. There will be two 'Thelmas'. It seems harsh to say neither one will be the genuine article - that she will no longer exist. 
Notice that the Psychological Criterion yields that neither 'Thelma' is Thelma - the psychological killer clause wipes her out. On the other hand, the Plain Brain Criterion seems to leave her status indeterminate. Do both 'Thelmas' have Thelma's original brain? The story involves a Delian Brain as well as a Delian Woman. We will return to Thelma later. 
Judith Jarvis Thomson points out that the Psychological Criterion of personal identity faces considerable embarrassment.​[16]​ Consider a 'branch-line' case of teletransportation (see pp. 199-201). A person, let's call her 'Nancy', enters the Teletransporter on Earth and is scanned. Her exact replica is created on Mars, and goes off to accomplish its (i.e. Nancy's) tasks. Meanwhile, a person who is psychologically continuous with Nancy and has, apparently uninterruptedly, possessed Nancy's original brain and body, steps out of the Teletransporter on Earth. Which one is Nancy? According to the Psychological Criterion (with its killer clause), neither one is Nancy. She no longer exists. If we introduce a non-lethal uniqueness clause, it will be indeterminate which of the resultant women is Nancy. And, if we eliminate the uniqueness clause altogether, there will be two Nancys. 
In fact, we feel confident that it's Nancy who walks from the Teletransporter - the woman on Mars isn't Nancy. We would, I think, persist in this view even if the person now on earth had been a bit stunned by the Scanner, and suffered mild amnesia - i.e. even if she had fewer psychological connections with the original person than does Replica. Nancy gives us reason to deny that the Psychological Criterion captures our present 'rules'. 


Phase Two - the Subtraction and Extension Arguments (Section 90)

In this phase, Parfit argues that it is 'relation R' that 'matters'; not identity. Given the potential ambiguity of 'what matters', his claim is open to at least three interpretations: (1) It is the R relation, rather than the 'same person' relation, that controls the temporal extension proper to egoistic concern. (2) Relation R governs the legitimate extension of self-identification. And (3) that relation controls all that is valuable in regard to personal identity over time. 
The R relation is composed of Psychological Connectedness and Psychological Continuity.​[17]​ What is 'Psychological Connectedness'?

Psychological connectedness is the holding of particular direct psychological connections. (p. 206)

The degree of psychological connectedness between X and Y is measured by the number of direct psychological connections between X and Y - the larger this number, the greater the degree of connectedness. (Ibid.) It might be a good idea to define this a bit more precisely. 

NumCon (X,t,Y,t*)  =df.  the number of direct psychological connections between X at t and Y at t*.
MaxCon (X,t)  =df.  the maximum number of direct psychological connections that could hold between X at t and someone at some later time.

Here is an attempt to define 'DegCon' (i.e. degree of psychological connectedness):

DegCon (X,t,Y,t*)  =df.   NumCon (X,t,Y,t*) /  MaxCon (X,t)

A closely related property is degree of similarity. Let's define it as follows: 

NumSim (X,t,Y,t*)  =df. the number of psychological features shared by X at t and Y at t*.
MaxSim (X,t)  =df. the number of psychological features shared between X at t and an exact psychological replica of X at t.
DegSim (X,t,Y,t*)  =df. NumSim (X,t,Y,t*) / MaxSim (X,t).

The crucial difference between DegCon and DegSim is that the former requires 'direct' causal linkage, while the latter does not. If each person on earth has an exact counterpart on 'Twin Earth', then the degree of similarity between each of us and our counterpart there is maximal (i.e. 1.)​[18]​ On the other hand, the degree of connectedness is minimal (i.e. 0).
Parfit apparently wants to show that psychological continuity and degree of connectedness (DegCon) are what are really important in regard to personal identity and that these properties control the legitimate extension of self identification and egoistic concern (i.e. they control 'survival' in Parfit's idiosyncratic sense).
Suppose Victoria loves Albert. What should matter to her in regard to his fate? The R relation links Albert equally strongly to both Brodrick and Chester - it branches. Personal identity doesn't branch. It can't link Albert to both Brodrick and Chester. 

On our view, the fact of personal identity just consists in the holding of relation R, when it takes a non-branching form. If personal identity just consists in this other relation, this other relation must be what matters. (pp. 262-263)

Let's call this the 'subtraction argument'. It's occurrence in the third printing version of Parfit's book might well puzzle an attentive reader. According to Parfit's present recommendations, we should not choose among the various criteria. But the subtraction argument plainly requires the assumption that we have adopted, or should adopt, a strictly psychological criterion. Other criteria don't yield the right remainder. Think, for example, of the Psycho-Physical Criterion. Psychological continuity is one requirement, and brain linkage is another. In addition, there is a killer clause. Hence, by subtraction of the killer clause, psychological continuity and brain linkage are what 'matter'. Psychological connectedness (i.e. DegCon) is not even in the running. 
Think again of the One-Track Brain Criterion. How should those who accept it describe 'what matters'? Suppose they reason in a way that runs parallel to the subtraction argument. Once again, Albert is fated to 'die'. But, presumably, it doesn't 'matter' - he is 'slain', so to speak, by nothing worse than a killer clause. So what does 'matter'? According to the One-Track Brain Criterion, personal identity is reducible to brain linkage plus uniqueness. Hence, by subtraction, it must be brain linkage that 'matters'. Of course this formulation is elliptical. In part it seems to mean that what should matter to Victoria, in so far as she loves Albert, is that there will be one or more people who are brain linked to him. 
The subtraction argument presupposes a psychological criterion that demands just two positive features: (a) psychological continuity and (b) psychological connectedness. In addition it must have a killer clause. But Thomson's case [Nancy and the Teletransporter] seems to show that our present 'rules' (or whatever) are not like this. Parfit himself no longer recommends such a criterion. Thus the argument looks derelict.

The 'extension argument' (as I call it) goes something like this:

(a) If identity were 'what matters', it would be fully appropriate for Victoria to feel little or no concern for Brodrick (or for Chester) since her beloved Albert will cease to exist. 
(b) But this reaction would not be appropriate. [If she really loves Albert, her concern should extend to Brodrick and Chester.] 
(c) Therefore, identity is not 'what matters' [i.e. is not the relation that should govern the extension of her concern].​[19]​

Premise (a) presupposes that Albert is fated to 'die' (because we have adopted, or should adopt, a killer clause). I don't think we have any compelling reason to describe the situation this way. We haven't yet adopted, and perhaps shouldn't adopt, a killer clause. [It is important to keep in mind that Albert's fate remains indeterminate until we change our present 'rules'.] As I see it, we should reject (a), and consequently the argument as a whole. 
Nevertheless, a bit more needs to be said. Imagine a philosopher arguing as follows:

What is it that should matter to people who really care about elephants? The natural view is that the extension of their concern is properly governed by the question 'Is it an elephant?' This is a mistake, as I will now demonstrate. Consider someone, say Elizabeth, who loves elephants. Imagine a genuine borderline case of an elephant - 'Gumbo'. By hypothesis, Elizabeth's solicitude and affection should extend to and include (sort of) Gumbo. But surely we could (and perhaps should) decide to refine the concept 'elephant' in such a way as to exclude him. Should Elizabeth stop caring about Gumbo because of this? Should her affection for him come to an end if and when we reclassify him? That would be foolish. Hence, strictly speaking, it is not the case that the extension of her affection and concern for elephants should be governed by the question "Is it an elephant?".

Something has gone wrong; but what? Well, someone might say, we don't have reason to declare Gumbo a non-elephant. Let's leave it indeterminate. This objection (although perhaps legitimate in its own little way) leaves the underlying tangle untouched. 
The extension of Elizabeth's solicitude (in regard to elephants) may quite properly be governed by the test "Is it an elephant?". Her solicitude may extend (sort of) to Gumbo since he is (you might say - sort of) an elephant. Suppose the concept 'elephant' were to be sharpened in such a way as to rule Gumbo out. There would then be at least three things that could happen. (1) Elizabeth deeply and fully accepts the revision, and yet her (sort of) solicitude for Gumbo remains undiminished. If that were to happen, I think we should conclude that the extension of her solicitude is no longer governed by the question "Is it an elephant?" (and perhaps never was). Another way things might turn out is: (2) She does not fully accept the revision; and is still (sort of) concerned about Gumbo. We take her solicitude as evidence that she hasn't 'internalized' the refined sense of 'elephant'. Finally: (3) She accepts the revision, and, consequently, no longer feels any concern about Gumbo. [Her solicitude is weightless - easily stopped.]
Given only that Elizabeth would go on caring about Gumbo even though we decided he wasn't really an elephant, it does not follow that the extension of her concern is not (now) legitimately governed by the question 'Is it an elephant?'.
Gunther is deeply committed to the well-being of a particular geranium (his dear mother left it to him in her will). He doesn't give a damn about geraniums (or plants) in general. What he cares about is this particular geranium. Given his commitment, what should govern its extension? The natural view would be that the 'same plant' relation should do the job. But this view faces the Parfitian objection, and, in particular, the case of the Divided Geranium.
It is certainly possible that Gunther's geranium should be divided in such a way that each of the resultant plants has an equally good claim to be the original. And (roughly speaking) each may be such that, if it alone had survived, 'it' would have been the legacy from Mom. It is also possible that in cases of botanical division  we should decide that neither plant is the original. Suppose we ask Gunther how he would feel if both these things happened (i.e. the plant is divided, and it has been decided that neither one is the original). Would he regard this as a disaster? He says he would not. Does this show his concern is not (now) governed by the question, "Is it Mom's geranium?". On the contrary. Perhaps the extension of his solicitude into the hypothetical situation is governed (and legitimately so) by the present sense of the question. He does not regard the division as a disaster precisely because, as things now stand, the status of the original plant would be indeterminate. 
Back to Thelma. She is worried about what sorts of lives the two 'Thelmas' will have. A philosophical friend reminds her that there is a lot of indeterminacy in regard to the fate of Delian entities, and he strongly recommends the view that she will no longer exist once the two 'Thelmas' are in operation. Thelma replies that his way of viewing the matter may well be the one we should adopt; but she is still worried.
It's a good bet that her concern about the future has been, and still is, governed by the question "What will happen to me?". We have no reason to think she has reorganized her thinking in compliance with her friend's recommendation. In fact, we have a way of testing the extent of her acceptance. Suppose she still (sort of) looks forward to some of the experiences of one or both 'Thelmas'. Suppose she continues to dread (sort of) those future pains. In that case, it seems clear that she has not fully 'internalized' the proposal that she will be neither woman. 
How could we show that the extent of Thelma's legitimate worry is not now governed by the identity question? Of course, if there were someone who plainly falls within the scope of her worry, and yet, plainly isn't Thelma, that would do the job. More to the point, suppose we could show that even if she did thoroughly accept the idea that Delian people cease to exist, this acceptance would leave her hopes and fears in regard to the future 'Thelmas' substantially unchanged. As I see it, this would only demonstrate that the extension of Thelma's worry is not invariably governed by the identity question (no matter how its sense may be modified). Worse yet, the supposition itself may be incoherent. If Thelma has learned not to anticipate the pleasures and pains of the future 'Thelmas', then there has been a substantial change. If she still (sort of) has those anticipations, then, it would seem, she hasn't thoroughly accepted her friend's suggestion. 
A Parfitian could argue from indeterminacy in regard to Thelma's fate. Our present 'rules' (or whatever) leave her future somewhat indeterminate. "But surely", the Parfitian might say, "there is no indeterminacy in regard to what really matters in this case. Both Thelmas should matter to her just as much as any possible future Thelma. Hence, it is not identity that controls the proper extension of Thelma's concern."
I think the extension of egoistic concern and self-identification with future people is governed by "Will it be me?". In fact, the claim appears tautological. In this sense (or these senses), identity is 'what matters'. 
Given our confusion about Delian people, Thelma may well fret. Nevertheless, it is not clear that there is anything momentous at stake. In fact, there may be just three threats to Thelma's well being: (1) Uniqueness itself may be valuable. (2) It may be desirable to have a determinate future. And (3) perhaps it is legitimate to want one's old brain and body. [Thelma has Delian problems about both.]


Phase Two - The Case for the R Relation (Section 96)

Parfit now assumes he has shown that identity is not 'what matters'. He wants to provide us with further arguments for the conclusion that psychological continuity and degree of connectedness are the things that do 'matter'. [Parfit takes them to 'matter' equally. See p. 301.]
Let's begin by looking at a short list of candidates (other than identity):

(1) Brain linkage (or having the same brain).
(2) Psychological continuity.
(3) Degree of connectedness (DegCon).
(4) Degree of similarity (DegSim).​[20]​
(5) Having the same body.

First a revealing procedural point. Parfit urges the following order: We should begin by getting the facts straight. Next, we should work out 'what matters'. And then (not before), we should decide upon the proper 'description' of the problematic situation. (See pp. 284-285) The 'facts' are prior to, and provide the appropriate base for, first our sense of 'what matters' and, subsequently, our decisions (or lack of them) about which person is which. 
This procedure stacks the cards against reductionists who hold, as I do, that identity governs the extent of legitimate self-identification and egoistic concern. From our point of view, the proper extension of egoistic concern (and love for other individuals) depends, partly, on 'rules', conventions, or whatever, in regard to personal identity. Would it be permissible to insist that Gunther should be able to figure out 'what matters' in regard to his mother's geranium from the 'bare facts' of the situation, apart from accepted conventions and 'rules' about plant identity? 

Consider the hypothesis that (1) is 'what matters'. The story about Thelma's brain might be taken as reason to reject it. But here is a case that has been offered in its defense. Gregory is an Egoist - all he cares about are his own pleasures and pains. A mad neuro-surgeon is about to manipulate Gregory's brain in such a way that the degree of psychological connectedness between the present Gregory and the resultant person will be zero. Consequently, there will be a compleat break in psychological continuity. In fact, the resultant person will be psychologically indistinguishable from Napoleon at his prime. (See pp. 229-231.) After the transformation, whoever-he-is will be tortured for days and then killed. Should Gregory be at all worried about those future pains? Certainly he should, if 'Napoleon' will be Gregory himself. But then it must be sameness of brain and body (or, perhaps, just sameness of brain) that is doing the job. 
Parfit rejects this line of thought. (pp. 283-284) In the first place, the relevant facts leave it indeterminate whether or not 'Napoleon' will, or will not, be Gregory. 

...should (Gregory) be egoistically concerned about the future of this person? Should (he) be concerned, though (he) know(s) that the physical continuity cannot cause it to be true, as a further fact, that this person will be (him)? In deciding what matters, (he) must here set aside all thoughts about (his) identity. The question about identity is here, empty. (He) must ask whether, in itself, physical continuity justifies egoistic concern. (p. 284)

On Parfit's view, it does not.
But if his fate is now indeterminate according to the established conventions and practices that provide the context within which Gregory thinks and has feelings about his future, why on earth shouldn't he be confused and frightened in (sort of) anticipation of that agony? 
Why do we give importance to the brain? [We are still working on candidate (1).] Parfit says the brain is important simply because it is "... the carrier of psychological continuity, or Relation R". (p. 284)  If this is the source of the brain's importance, then when it fails to do the job, it lacks importance for the person who's brain it was. 
I think the brain is important for what might be called 'systematic' reasons. In trying to work out a coherent account of our present 'intuitions' in regard to personal identity, the brain emerges as a crucial factor. No doubt it acquires this role because it is the organ that 'does' our thinking, hoping, fearing, and so on. 
Is (3) all that 'matters'? Suppose the number of direct psychological connections that would hold between the present Cynthia and the possible future self with whom she would be maximally connected is roughly 3.7 million. The number of such connections between Cynthia now and Cynthia exactly ten years from now is about 2.9 million. Hence, her present degree of connectedness to that future self is about .784. Presumably, Parfit would hold that it is rationally permissibly for her to be roughly that much less concerned about the things that will happen to her in ten years than she is about the immediate future. (See p. 314) [We are leaving aside the uncertainty of future events.]
Delayed Replication: Suppose Cynthia is Telescanned, but not replicated. The information about her present structure is stored. An exact replica of the present Cynthia will be created ten years from today. Problem: is it perfectly understandable that Cynthia should be quite a bit more concerned about the fate of the replica than about her own fate ten years hence? Does it make perfect sense for her to be equally concerned about how things will go for her in the next few weeks and about how things will go for the replica in those early weeks ten years from now? Such behavior would strike me as decidedly odd.
Of course it is still possible that DegCon matters quite a bit, given identity. That is to say, perhaps it is legitimate for Thelma to be less concerned about the old lady she will eventually become than about the woman she will be tomorrow.
Are (1) - (5) all together the things that 'matter'? On this hypothesis, Teletransportation is catastrophic. Psychological continuity is maintained, and there is a high degree of psychological connectedness; but Replica does not have the brain and body of the original person, nor is brain-linkage maintained. Does this matter? Parfit denies that this is a recipe for disaster.

Why should I want it to be true that this brain and body gets to Mars? Once again, the natural fear is that only this ensures that I shall get to Mars. But this again assumes that whether or not I get to Mars is, here, a real question. And we have been forced to conclude that it is an empty question. Even if this question has a best answer, we could know exactly what will happen before deciding what this answer is. Since this is so, can I rationally care a great deal whether or not this person's brain and body will be my present brain and body? I believe that, while it may not be irrational to care a little, to care a great deal would be irrational. (p. 286)

Parfit apparently assumes that the Teletransporter generates indeterminate identity. Is he right? It seems quite clear that there is no indeterminacy in Nancy's case. Suppose she is told that the Teletransporter has developed a peculiar quirk. Two and one half hours after its successful operation, either Replica or Original suddenly melts. "Do you have any preference in this regard madam?", the attendant robot asks. Nancy, in fact cares a great deal; and why shouldn't she? 
Under our present 'rules' (or whatever), Replica is someone other than the original person. Nevertheless, Replica is psychologically continuous with that person and their degree of connectedness is as high as that between the original person and Original. Hence, on Parfit's view, Replica 'matters' as much as Original. This means, in part, that Nancy should feel as much egoistic concern about Replica's fate as about her own. Apparently it is also proper for Nancy to anticipate the pleasures and pains (e.g. the misery of melting) Replica will experience - even though she legitimately believes she won't be that woman. I take this to count strongly against the theory.
[Incidentally, Replica's situation looks deplorable. She may well know she is not the person she tends to think she is. It would be natural for her to feel very angry about Nancy's decision even though she 'remembers' having made it. Replicas are going to need a lot of therapy.]
I end this section with a mini-drama. We return to Randolf and Felicia. Yesterday Randolf took the precaution of creating five exact (molecule for molecule) duplicates of himself. They are psychologically continuous with yesterday's Randolf; but they do not have his actual brain or body. Now they are down in Randolf's basement playing cards and drinking beer. If Algernon should find out about this, he would, almost certainly, fall into a frenzy of rage. It is entirely understandable that hatred for Randolf should spill over into hatred for those jolly men. [Hatred may comply with Parfit's conception of what is important.] Felicia knows about the duplicates, and is upset. She wishes they had never been made, and this wish perplexes her. After all, poor Randolf may be killed tomorrow. Shouldn't she be glad replacements are on hand? [Randolf  insists that he himself must fight the duel - it's a matter of honor.]

Randolf: If you loved me, you would be glad they exist.
Felicia: Oh Randolf! How can you say that? 
Randolf: They're exactly like me. If you don't care about them, you don't care about me.
Felicia: No! No! [weeping] Randolf please! It is because I love you - because I love you - that they upset me. If you're killed, what will they mean to me? They aren't you. 
Randolf: I don't understand. For God's sake, stop crying!
Felicia: [Gathering herself together] You seem to think of yourself as a sort of form or pattern - all those embodiments equally good, equally you. I don't think like that. Your scars are real - Theirs are copies. Their arms have never held me,  never will!
Randolf: Suppose I am killed.
Felicia: Oh! 
Randolf: If you knew that, would you still wish I hadn't made them?
Felicia: [long pause - head down] Yes.
Randolf: I don't understand.





One of the principal projects in Reasons and Persons is an attempt to defeat a certain theory of rationality, namely the 'Self-interest Theory'. This is a theory about how all rational creatures ought to conduct themselves. The theory is made up, in part, of the following claims:
(S1) For each person, there is one supremely rational ultimate aim: that his life go, for him, as well as possible. (p. 4)
(S2)​[21]​ What it would be rational for anyone to do is what will bring him the greatest expected benefit. (p.8)
(S3) The supremely rational desire is that one's life go as well as possible for oneself. (p.8)
(S4) The supremely rational disposition is that of someone who is never self-denying. (p.8)
(EC) A rational person should be equally concerned about all the parts of his future. (p. 313)​[22]​

One powerful objection to this theory is that fully rational creatures can be motivated, for example, by benevolence - even though this leads them to act against their own interest. There is nothing 'irrational' about this. (See pp. 130-132, & 192-194).
Can't the same strategy be used against any proposed competing theory of rationality? Suppose, for example, someone claims that fully rational behavior is behavior governed primarily by moral considerations. Couldn't we say in reply that this can't be true since there is nothing 'irrational' about pure self-interest? Perhaps we should be pluralists, rather than monists, in regard to the motivation and behavior required by rationality.
Notice that there is no obvious absurdity in holding that the Self-Interest Theory (as stated above) is patently false (since benevolence is rationally permissible) and also holding that it is rationally permissible to be governed by self-interest.
Parfit wants to refute the Self-Interest Theory. There is no doubt about that. Would he also like to show that there is something a bit irrational about governance by self-interest? Perhaps so; but there is no decisive evidence of this in Reasons and Persons. I stress this point because some readers get the opposite impression.
Let's take a quick look at the 'what matters' argument against the Self-Interest Theory. This attack is directed against (EC). Parfit undertakes to show that it is rationally permissible to be unequally concerned about the different parts of our future. If this is permissible, then (EC) is false.

(1) If the Reductionist View is correct, then the two relations that 'matter' are psychological connectedness and continuity. (p. 313)
(2) The Reductionist View is correct.
(3) Connectedness is a matter of degree, and diminishes as distance into the future increases. (See pp. 298-302; also p. 469)
(4) The relations that 'matter' provide our legitimate reasons for being specially concerned about our own future. (pp. 313 & 315)
(5) If J has two grounds for caring about the future, and one of these diminishes with distance, then it is rationally permissible for J to care less about J's more distant future than about events nearer the present. (p. 313)
(6) Hence, it is rationally permissible for us to care less about our more distant future than about events nearer the present.​[23]​

A parallel argument for the claim that rationality requires us to care less about our more distant future (an argument which Parfit does not give) might go like this:

(1) If the Reductionist View is correct, then the two relations that 'matter' are psychological connectedness and continuity.
(2) The Reductionist View is correct.
(3) Connectedness is a matter of degree, and diminishes as distance into the future increases.
(4') The relations that 'matter' provide the legitimate reasons for a rational creature's concern about its own future.
(5') Where J is any rational creature, if J has two grounds for caring about the future, and one of these diminishes with distance, then it is rationally mandatory for J to care less about J's more distant future than about events nearer the present.​[24]​
(6') Hence, it is irrational not to care less about the more distant future than about events nearer the present.









^1	   The story comes from David Wiggins' Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1967, pp. 50-56. For Parfit's narration, see Reasons and Persons, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984, pp. 254-255.
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^16	   Ob. Cit.  pp. 225-227.
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